In this paper, we empirically derive the welfare function that guarantees that the current German tax and transfer system for single women is optimal. In particular, we compare the welfare function conditional on the presence and age of children and assess how recent reforms of in-kind childcare transfers affect the welfare function. Our analysis is based on a discrete model of optimal taxation. We apply this framework using microsimulation and microeconometric techniques. In general, we find that marginal welfare weights are relatively high for non-working single women. Further, we show that the reform of in-kind childcare transfers is only optimal if society increases the marginal welfare weights for the working single women.
INTRODUCTION
Given the observed tax and transfer system in Germany, what is the social welfare function that guarantees that this system is optimal? The purpose of this paper is to empirically answer this question by combining the theory of optimal taxation with microsimulation and microeconometric techniques. The focus of our analysis is on single mothers and the design of taxes, cash and in-kind benefits targeted at this group. In particular, we study the welfare function of the society for this group conditional on the presence and age of children in households of single mothers and assess how a reform of in-kind childcare subsidies affects this welfare function.
The starting point of our analysis are two observations. First, child-related in-kind as well as cash benefits strongly depend on the age of the children. Thus, it seems that the society weights the equity-efficiency tradeoff differently for families with children of different age groups. For example, in Germany single mothers with very young children are generally not expected to participate in the labor market, and if, only for few hours. Moreover, they receive relatively high out-of-work transfers. Obviously, for this group, society is more concerned about equity than efficiency in terms of employment. 1 The second observation is linked to the fact that the design of in-kind benefits in terms of subsidized childcare is currently under rigorous reform in Germany. While subsidized childcare for children younger than three years has hardly been available in the past decades, at least in West Germany, recently several reforms have been introduced that aim at increasing childcare for this group of children conditional on employment of their parents. Thus, it seems that for this group, efficiency concerns are currently getting more important than used to be the case in the past.
The optimal design of transfer programs, and the tradeoff between equity and efficiency, has been intensively analyzed in the economic literature. The seminal theoretical contribution is Mirrlees (1971) , which has been extended in several dimensions over the last decades. The theoretical extension that is central for this analysis is Saez (2002) , who proposes a discrete model of optimal taxation where individuals can adjust their labor supply behavior along the extensive ( participation) and the intensive (working hours) margin. The empirical literature on the optimality of taxation and transfers is still scarce; recent examples based on microsimulation techniques are Bourguignon and Spadaro (2008) and Immervoll et al. (2007) . Blundell et al. (2009) combine microsimulation and microeconometric techniques and apply the theoretical model of optimal taxation of Saez (2002) to discuss the transfer system toward lone mothers in Germany and the United Kingdom. 2 We apply the same empirical method as in Blundell et al. (2009) to discuss the optimal design of income taxation and transfers for single women conditional on children and the age of children in Germany. We focus on single women for a number of reasons. First, lone mothers are eligible for generous transfer programs, and the interaction of transfer programs and the income tax system can generate budget constraints with high and variable effective marginal tax rates. Second, there is a ( partly emotional) debate about the extent to which lone mothers should be supported by the state, even when they do not work, and about the support singles without children should receive from the government. This is in particular true for lone parents with preschool-age children. Moreover, in practical terms, focusing on lone adult households allows us to avoid the substantial complexity to both, models of labor supply, as well as optimal tax theory that arises when dealing with household decisions of labor supply.
We extend the paper of Blundell et al. (2009) by comparing the optimal design conditional on the age of children and by explicitly accounting for inkind subsidies of childcare. This is important since child-related in-kind transfers, that is transfers that are channeled directly to institutions and not to households, make up a large share of resources allocated toward families with children.
We find that German society has a relatively strong taste of redistribution toward non-working single women. The marginal welfare weights for nonworking women are clearly higher than for the working, and this result holds regardless of the presence and age of children. We further find that a reform of in-kind childcare subsidies conditioned on employment markedly changes the marginal welfare function of the society for the targeted groups. The reform is only optimal from a welfare perspective if society increases marginal welfare weights for the working lone mothers.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview about the German tax and benefit system with a particular focus on transfers and taxation of households with children. Moreover, we discuss the work incentives the current design of the tax and transfer system induces.
Main characteristics of the German tax-transfer system
The main characteristics of the German tax-transfer system are a progressive income tax schedule with a basic allowance of 7,664 euros. 3 Additionally, there exist child allowances amounting to 2,924 euros per year per child. Married spouses can file jointly and make use of full income splitting. Single parents can draw an additional single parents' tax allowance amounting to 1,208 euros per year.
The most important cash transfer for families with dependent children in Germany is the child benefit ('Kindergeld') that amounts to about 150 euros per month per child and is granted regardless of the family's income. For children younger than three years, there is an additional child-rearing benefit ('Erziehungsgeld') of 300 euros per month that can be drawn for a maximum period of 24 months. This benefit is means-tested and is only granted if one of the parents is on parental leave, i.e. not working more than 30 hours per week. The income threshold up to which this benefit is granted differs by age of the child and amounts to about 30,000 euros in the first six months after childbirth and is reduced to about 16,500 euros per year for children aged 3. All numbers are for the fiscal year 2005. between 7 and 24 months. Above this income threshold, the benefit is withdrawn at a rate of 62% based on household income. 4 Besides these family-related benefits, Germany has a relatively generous system of out-of-work benefits. Unemployed individuals who are eligible for unemployment benefits within the social security system receive about 65% of their net earnings for several months, depending on their age and the time they have been contributing to the social security system. People who do not have claims to unemployment benefits receive social assistance. Social assistance has been rigorously reformed in 2005. Before this reform, there were two different benefits. Long-term unemployed persons who were eligible for transfers from the unemployment insurance were granted a transfer called 'Arbeitslosenhilfe' that amounted to 53% of their net earnings prior unemployment. Persons who were not eligible to this transfer got 'Sozialhilfe', which consisted of a basic transfer amounting to about 300 euros per month with additional transfers for children, single parents, etc. Costs for housing were paid extra, depending on the size of the household. In 2005, the two transfers, 'Arbeitslosenhilfe' and 'Sozialhilfe', were combined into one transfer scheme called 'Arbeitslosengeld II' that does not depend on previous earnings. This transfer now consists of a basic allowance of about 350 euros per month. It is topped up by allowances for children, other family members as well as housing costs depending on household size. Single parents get an additional allowance. For a single mother with a child under 14 years these benefits add up to 676 euros per month plus housing costs amounting to 350 euros on average. Note that the child benefit is not added up to social assistance but counted as income that is fully withdrawn. In contrast, the child-rearing benefit is granted on top of social assistance. Once recipients of 'Arbeitslosengeld II' start working, the transfer is withdrawn at a rate of 70-85% depending on the amount of wage income.
In contrast to countries such as the United Kingdom or the United States, the tax and transfer system in Germany does not include large transfer programs that are conditional on employment, such as the Working Tax Credit or the Earned Income Tax Credit. The only exception is the 'Kinderzuschlag', which is a small transfer program for families with dependent children. The scheme is targeted at families who have enough earnings such that the minimum subsistence level -defined by the amount of the 'Arbeitslosengeld II' transferis met for the parents, however, not for the children. These families receive a transfer of 140 euros per month per child that is withdrawn at a rate of 70%. The scheme is not very generous in terms of the number of recipients, since the income range of eligibility for this transfer is very small. Moreover, single mothers receiving maintenance payments for their children by the children's 4. In January 2007, the child-rearing benefit was replaced by a new scheme of parental leave benefits called 'Elterngeld'. This new benefit is not means-tested but rather related to prebirth earnings of the parent who is on parental leave. Parents who have not been working before the birth of their child receive a minimum amount of 300 euros per month. The means test has been abolished; however, the maximum duration period has been reduced to 14 months. For more details on this reform, see Spiess and Wrohlich (2008) . father are not eligible for this transfer. This is because the 'Kinderzuschlag' is fully withdrawn if the child has income on his own, and maintenance payments are considered as income of the child.
Childcare institutions
Subsidies for childcare in Germany are mostly granted directly to childcare centers rather than to parents. Hence, these transfers can be characterized as inkind transfers rather than direct cash transfers to the households. 5 Childcare centers are either run by local authorities such as the communities or by private, mostly non-profit, institutions such as churches or other associations who all receive subsidies. The parents' fees that are charged by childcare centers are income dependent and make up 30% of total costs at most. On average, the parents' fees amount to about 70 euros per month for a part-time slot and 110 euros per month for a full-time slot. While, on the one hand, parents' fees for subsidized childcare are relatively low compared with other European countries (see e.g. Immervoll and Barber, 2005) , availability of childcare is limited, in particular for children under three years living in West Germany. The average availability rate of childcare slots for this group of children amounted to 3% in 2002. East Germany, however, has high availability rates, which amount on average to 37%. 6 Previous empirical studies have shown that there is a considerable excess demand for subsidized childcare slots, in particular for children under three years. More than a third of all children under three years do not have access to a childcare slot although their parents demand childcare (Wrohlich, 2008) . These families thus have to rely on privately organized childcare that comes at markedly higher costs. On average, privately organized full-time care costs about 860 euros per month, part-time care about 430 euros per month.
Based on this information, a sort of 'expected' costs (ec) of childcare can be computed. These costs consist of a weighted average of the subsidized parents' fees (c s ) and the private costs (c m ), where the weights are calculated on the basis of the probability ( p) that a child does not have access to subsidized childcare (see Wrohlich, 2007 , for more details):
The individual rationing probability p is estimated on the basis of a partial observability model of demand and supply of subsidized childcare such as suggested in Wrohlich (2008) . Averages of these probabilities are reported in 5. The only exception is that childcare costs can be deducted from taxable income up to a maximum amount of 1,500 euros per year per child. From January 2007 on, the possibility to deduct childcare costs from taxable income has been formulated more generously. The amount of deductible expenses has been increased up to 4,000 euros per year per child. 6. See Wrohlich (2007) for more details on the availability of childcare by age group and different regions in Germany.
Table 1 for children of three different age groups. Rationing is highest for children in the youngest age group and it is also relatively high for school children who need afternoon care in the case that their mothers are working full-time.
As can be seen from Table 1 , expected costs of childcare are considerably higher than average parents' fees and amount to about 350 euros per month for a full-time slot for children of the younger age group. The difference between parents' fees and expected childcare costs is lowest for children aged three to six years, which is due to the low level of rationing of subsidized childcare for this group of children.
In the empirical analysis, we will interpret the difference between the costs of privately organized childcare c m and the expected costs of childcare ec as subsidies within the tax-transfer system. These 'expected subsidies' es can thus be stated as
and are also reported in Table 1 . It becomes evident from this table that the subsidies resulting from the in-kind provision of subsidized childcare are by far the largest child-related transfer for the group of families with children under ten years. Note that we assume that mothers with children from three to six years use part-time childcare even if they are not working. This is in line with the empirical distribution of childcare utilization in Germany (see Wrohlich, 2007) . Mothers with children younger than three years, however, are assumed to purchase childcare only if they are working. Thus, by definition, only those with children younger than three years who are working receive in-kind subsidies. We use a similar argument for mothers with children in primary school age, i.e. seven to ten years. We assume that mothers only have to purchase childcare in the afternoon if they are working full time. The costs and benefits of schooling are not considered in this paper.
Work incentives for single mothers with children
Given the relatively generous out-of-work benefits and the relatively high childcare costs that result from the excess demand for subsidized childcare slots, the work incentives for single mothers are relatively low. One way to summarize the structure of work incentives is to visualize budget lines for an example household. Figure 1 shows net household income of a single mother earning low wages (7.5 euros per month, which corresponds to the 25th percentile of the female wage distribution) with a four-year-old child as a function of her working hours. The dark-gray line on the top depicts net income as a function of working hours. The budget line of this household is very flat over the whole distribution of working hours, which is due to the high withdrawal rate of the means-tested transfers. If the mother increases working hours, net household income increases only by a very small amount. This is even more striking if childcare costs are taken into account. The lightgray dotted line on the bottom depicts net income less total costs of childcare. As has been explained above, we assume that the mother with children between three and six years is purchasing part-time childcare even if she is not working. If her working time exceeds 20 hours, we assume that she 284 needs to buy full-time care. This is the reason for the large kink in the budget line at the 21st hour. However, parents do not have to bear full childcare costs as has been explained above, but only 'expected costs of childcare', i.e. parents' fees that are highly subsidized if they have access to such a slot, and full costs otherwise. Taking into account these subsidies that are incorporated in the 'expected childcare costs' leads to the dark solid line in the middle. This line depicts the actual disposable income of a family. The difference between this line and the dotted line at the bottom can be interpreted as the amount of the childcare subsidies.
As can be seen from Table 1 , expected childcare costs differ considerably between age groups of children because of different amounts of subsidies. Thus, disposable income as a function of working hours looks differently for families with children in different age groups. Figure 2 summarizes budget constraints of a single mother with an hourly wage of 7.5 euros for children of three different age groups. The uppermost line depicts disposable income of a mother with a one-year-old child. Income for this family type is highest because of the child-rearing benefit that is granted on top of social assistance and withdrawn only above a threshold of 16,500 euros. However, this benefit is fully withdrawn once the mother's working time exceeds 30 hours, making full-time work for this group of individuals very unattractive. Note also that the budget line for this household types shows a large kink at the first working hour. The reason for this is that we assume that mothers with children in this age group do not use childcare if they are not working. Once they start to work, however, we assume that they need to buy at least parttime childcare. The light-gray dotted line depicts the budget line for single mothers with a four-year-old child. In absolute terms, this household has a lower disposable income; however, work incentives are markedly higher than for women with younger children. First, the child-rearing benefit is not granted any more, and second childcare costs are much lower. The black line shows disposable income of a single mother with a child who is eight years old. Since this child is attending school in the morning, we assume that childcare costs only occur if the mother's working time exceeds 20 hours. Since rationing of subsidized childcare is much more present for this group of children than for children aged three to six years, disposable income of mothers working more than 20 hours with children in this age group is lower than for mothers with children aged three to six years.
Recent childcare policy reforms
In the past couple of years, the German government has been stressing the importance of childcare opportunities, not least due to the declining fertility rates and the low labor force participation of women. At the center of the debate are children in the age group under three years. For children between three and six years, parents have a legal claim for a part-time slot regardless of their working status since 1996. For children below three years, however, availability of childcare slots is limited, as has been explained above. In 2005, the government passed a law that aims at increasing the provision of childcare slots for children under three years. According to this law ('Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz -TAG'), childcare slots have to be provided for all children whose parents work or wish to work. The necessary additional number of childcare slots will be provided by 2010. Thus, this reform proposal can in fact be seen as a transfer conditional on work similar to the WFTC in the United Kingdom. However, in contrast to the United Kingdom this transfer is a work-conditioned in-kind benefit. As a consequence of the reform, childcare costs for households with children under three years are markedly reduced if parents are working. Figure 3 shows how disposable income changes for a single mother with a one-year-old child. The light-gray dotted line at the top depicts net income without considering childcare costs. The gray line at the bottom depicts the family's disposable income before the reform, while the black line shows disposable income after the reform. Because availability of childcare is increased, mothers who did not get a childcare slot before the reform now do not have to rely on relatively expensive private childcare and thus childcare costs are markedly reduced.
In Section 4, we will simulate this 'TAG' reform. In a second step, we will extend the program also to children aged six to ten years. More specifically, we will assume that afternoon-care for children in primary school age will be provided at the current parents' fees for all children whose mothers are working.
METHODOLOGY
In the following section, we present the methodological framework for the analysis of the optimality of the tax-transfer system for single women. As stressed above, the theoretical background for our analysis is the optimal tax model, which has been derived by Saez (2002) . We follow Blundell et al. (2009) and use microsimulation and microeconometric techniques to apply the theoretical model for an empirical analysis of the optimal design of income taxation.
The theoretical model
The problem of optimal income taxation can be described as follows: a social planner, for example the government, maximizes a social welfare function given its budget constraint. The social welfare function is a transformed function of individual utilities that themselves depend on net household income, or consumption, and leisure. In the proposed framework of optimal income taxation, the margin along which individuals can adjust their behavior is their labor supply. 7 This leads to the well-known controversy 7. As well documented in the literature (see Feldstein, 1995; Gruber and Saez, 2002) , the relevant elasticity for the optimal design of income tax is not the labor supply elasticity but the elasticity of taxable income that tends to be larger. Since in this application we focus on the optimal taxation of single women, this seems to be less of a problem. For this group labor income is by far the most important source of income, and therefore the two different definitions of elasticities should be quite similar. between equity and efficiency. Whereas transfer programs, or negative tax payments, can increase the disposable income of the disadvantaged, and thus increase their well-being, financing these programs with positive income tax rates introduces disincentives to work, and, in general, will lead to a reduction in labor supply of the working population. Saez (2002) sets up an optimal tax problem where there are I þ 1 discrete groups in the labor market: I groups of individuals who do work, plus one group consisting of those who do not work. In the empirical analysis, we distinguish the I þ 1 discrete groups by gross earnings. Individuals choose whether or not to participate (the extensive margin), and decide which group to choose (the intensive margin). In the framework of Saez, optimal taxation has the following form:
In this expression, T i is net tax paid by group i and C i is the net household income of this group. Hence, the term on the left-hand side is the extra tax paid when moving from group i À 1 to i divided by the gain in net income. The non-working receive benefits À T 0 , by definition identical to C 0 . The gross earnings of group i, equal to C i þ T i , are exogenously fixed. h i measures the share of group i in the population. The social welfare function of the government is summarized by g i , the marginal welfare weight the government assigns to group i.
The marginal welfare weight is the key parameter for our analysis. In the empirical analysis, we follow Bourguignon and Spadaro (2008) and invert equation (3) to retrieve the distribution of marginal welfare weights, which guarantee that a given tax and transfer system is optimal. The marginal welfare weight g i has to be interpreted as the value for the government of redistributing an extra unit of money to group i. In other words, the marginal social welfare weights represent a government's attitude toward redistribution among the discrete household types. As discussed in detail by Saez (2002) , the marginal welfare weights depend directly on the original welfare function of the government weighted by the marginal utility for income of the households and the distribution of the population at the discrete points. Ceteris paribus for a utilitarian government with no preference for redistribution, the marginal welfare weights are constant. In contrast, a government with a high redistributive taste has a marginal welfare function g( Á ), which is decreasing with gross earnings.
The other central parameters that determine the optimal design of income taxation are the elasticities on the intensive and the extensive margin.
The intensive elasticity, m i , is defined as: This mobility elasticity captures the percentage increase in supply of group i when C i À C i À 1 is increased by 1%, and is defined under the assumption that individuals are restricted to adjust their labor supply to the neighboring choice.
Finally, Z i is a measure of the extensive elasticity. This is defined as the percentage of individuals in group i who stop working when the difference between the net household income out of work and at earnings point i is reduced by 1%: 8
One main implication of the optimal tax rule above is that the optimal tax system depends heavily on whether labor supply responses are concentrated at the intensive or extensive margin. When the extensive elasticity is assumed to be zero, Saez's model gives results similar to Mirrlees', where negative marginal tax rates are never optimal. However, the greater is the extensive elasticity compared with the intensive elasticity, the more likely it is that the optimal schedule will feature relative smaller guaranteed income for nonworkers, and negative marginal taxes at low levels of earnings.
Empirical framework
The database for the empirical analysis is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative sample of private households living in Germany with yearly information on household incomes, hours worked and the household structure. 9 The dataset includes detailed information about the socioeconomic situation of more than 12,000 households that represent all private households living in Germany. For this analysis, we draw on an unbalanced panel of single women for the fiscal years 1999-2004. 10 We focus on women aged between 18 and 60 years, and exclude self-employed, retired and women in full-time education. Overall, this results in 5,801 observations. Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the whole population and for the key subgroups of our analysis: single women without children, with children in secondary school age or older, i.e. older than ten years, with children in primary school age, aged seven to ten years, and single women with children aged six years or younger. As discussed above, transfers differ for children younger than three years. On the one hand, child-rearing benefits for this group are very generous and only withdrawn at high 8. As discussed by Blundell et al. (2009) , this definition is different from the conventional extensive elasticity, or elasticity of labor force participation, which is defined as the proportional increase in workers when net incomes increase by 1%. 9. A description of the SOEP can be downloaded from http://www.diw.de/soep; see also
Haisken De-New and Frick (2005) . 10. For the fiscal information we make use of the retrospective information. Thus, we use the waves 2000-05. incomes. Yet, on the other hand, availability of public childcare is very low for children in the youngest age group leading to high childcare costs. Therefore, it would be interesting to further distinguish the group with children below three years. However, unfortunately the data yield too few observations for working women with very young children to guarantee a reliable and robust analysis. Roughly 60% of all singles have no children, about 25% have children older than ten years, about 7% are lone mothers with primary school-age children and less than 10% have children younger than seven years. The descriptive statistics on employment behavior show the expected pattern: singles without children have the highest employment rate with over 85%. The rate is only slightly lower for mothers with school-aged children. However, less than 45% of lone mothers with preschool-age children are employed. Furthermore, lone mothers with young children have on average the lowest share of high education, and as a consequence the lowest gross wages, and are on average about ten years younger than the overall population mean.
In order to apply the above-specified optimal tax model to analyze the design of the tax-transfer system in Germany, information about the tax and transfers, the gross earnings, the behavioral parameters and the distribution of the population along the discrete points is required. As stressed above, we define the I þ 1 discrete points along the gross earnings distribution. This is the relevant information, since governments mainly condition the tax schedule on gross earnings. We apply a microsimulation model for Germany (STSM) to derive the tax and transfer payment and the resulting net household income at each discrete point. 11 The behavioral parameters, i.e. preferences for income and leisure, that allow the calculation of the labor supply elasticities on the extensive and the intensive margin, as defined above, are estimated based on a static structural labor supply model. 
Labor supply estimation
In line with Blundell et al. (2009) , we do not calibrate the labor supply elasticities of various groups, but derive labor supply elasticities from a static structural discrete-choice model of labor supply, as, for example, in van Soest (1995) . This allows us to account for heterogeneity of behavioral responses in the population, which is crucial if we want to assess the design of transfers for the subgroups defined above, i.e. conditional on the presence and age of children. 12 As we focus only on single households, the framework for labor supply is relatively straightforward. For this group we define six discrete working choices, inactivity, three part-time and two full-time alternatives that describe the distribution of the working behavior. 13 At each discrete hours point j, the household i in period t receives utility V ijt , which is assumed to depend on a function U of the woman's leisure L ijt , her disposable income C ijt and on observed and unobserved household characteristics, Z jt and a i , and on a random term e ijt :
Following McFadden (1974) , we assume that the error terms e ijt follow an extreme value distribution, and therefore the discrete-choice model can be estimated by conditional logit. The individual error term a i is specified nonparametrically following Heckman and Singer (1984) . We assume that a i is described by a bivariate discrete distribution with two points of support (mass points) (a 1 , a 2 ), which are constant for all households. 14 Each household has a probability p k , kAf1, 2g, for each point of the unobserved heterogeneity. The likelihood to be maximized is then:
where d itj 5 1 if j is the chosen alternative and 0 otherwise, and Pr(Y it 5 j) is the choice probability for alternative j. For the specification of the utility function, we assume a utility function quadratic in income and leisure, similar to Blundell et al. (2000) .
In Appendix A, we discuss the results of the estimation by providing information about the behavioral reactions of households induced by changes in work incentives. 12. In contrast to the theoretical model of Saez, we account for potential income effects in the labor supply estimation. Given the very small and insignificant income effect (see , this consistency is not of importance. 13. The following hour classification is used: [0, 5], ]5, 15], ]15, 22], ]22, 28], ]28, 35], 435. 14. More flexible models with more points of support either did not affect the results or did not converge. 
OPTIMAL WELFARE FUNCTION
Given the theoretical model of Saez and the empirical strategy we discuss the optimality of the tax-transfer system for single mothers in Germany. Instead of deriving the optimal tax schedule given an assumed welfare function, as, for example, in Blundell et al. (2009) , we follow Bourguignon and Spadaro (2008) and invert the tax formula to derive the marginal welfare weights that makes the current tax and benefit system for single women optimal. At first glance it might seem problematic to derive an optimal tax schedule for a subpopulation, in our case single women. However, the government can positively or negatively discriminate single households and explicitly targets transfers toward singles with children. 15 In other words, in this analysis we discuss the optimality of income taxation for single women and take taxation of the rest of the population as exogenous and constant.
As stressed above, we define the I þ 1 discrete groups along the gross earnings distribution, I groups for positive earnings and in addition the group of nonworkers who have zero gross earnings. For this application we define four income classes along the actual earnings distribution of the relevant group. As we assume that households adjust their behavior along J discrete working points, it is necessary to translate the changes in the working behavior to the I discrete earnings points. Given the individual wage and the actual working behavior we assign each woman to the discrete income point that has the minimum distance to her individual wage working hours combination. In this way we can derive an extensive and intensive elasticity for each discrete earnings points. Moreover, by using the microsimulation model we can derive the net tax payments at each point. With this information we can simulate equation (3) to retrieve the marginal welfare weights for the current system. For identification we follow Saez (2002) and normalize the marginal welfare weights g i :
We perform simulations for the whole population and separately for the above-defined subpopulations, conditional on the presence and age of children. For the simulation of the subgroups we make a further ceteris paribus assumption, namely that households in all other groups are not affected and that their tax schedule remains constant.
As mentioned above, childcare subsidies by the government form the most important part of overall child-related transfers. In our analysis we treat those subsidies in the same way as general child benefits and other benefits for single households. In Appendix A (Table A. 2) we provide simulations that do not take into account the income generated by in-kind childcare facilities.
15. The income tax legislation in Germany mainly discriminates between households with and without children, and by marital status.
Optimality of the tax and benefit system: the current system
In the first panel of Table 3 we present the simulation results for the population of all single women. Next to the information describing the current tax and transfer system (columns 1-4) , and the behavioral responses (columns 5-7), we present the marginal welfare weights at the discrete points that make the current system optimal. For better interpretation we present the welfare weights as defined above, and normalized relative to the optimal weight for the single women that are non-working.
As discussed above, we assume that lone mothers with children aged between three and six years use childcare even when not working. Therefore, on average gross earnings out of work are negative. The in-kind transfers that households receive for childcare are included in the net taxes. For the nonworking women and the women at the lowest earnings point net taxes are negative; thus they receive higher transfers than the income taxes they pay.
For the groups at higher earnings taxes exceed transfers. This explains why the net incomes are more equally distributed over the population than the gross earnings.
Comparing the elasticities on the intensive and the extensive margin, we find that behavioral responses are stronger on the extensive margin, which suggests that in-work credits might be optimal (Saez, 2002) . In line with Blundell et al. (2009) , our results show that the current tax and transfer system is optimal when the government assigns lower welfare weights to the working population than to the non-working population. We find that on average the optimal marginal welfare weights for the working population are about 40% of the value for the non-working population. This result has two different explanations, which are difficult to disentangle: (i) the redistributional taste and (ii) the equity-efficiency tradeoff. First, if the government has a taste for redistribution the marginal welfare weights should be higher at lower earnings points, i.e. out of work. Moreover, as stressed above, the difference between the behavioral responses on the intensive and the extensive margin suggests that in-work credits could be optimal. Hence, only with relatively high marginal welfare weights for the women out of work, the current transfer system with a lower efficiency than with in-work credits can be justified. Interestingly, we find that the marginal welfare weights are higher at the two highest earnings points relative to the lowest positive earnings point. This implies that the government does not have a marginal welfare function that is decreasing with earnings, which is in line with the very high marginal tax rates for women at low working hours.
The picture slightly changes when focusing only on lone mothers with children younger than seven years and assuming taxation of all other groups to be constant. In general, this is the group that receives the highest amount of transfers. On average transfers are higher than taxes at all earnings points. This is reflected in the relatively even distribution of net household incomes. As mentioned above, we assume that childcare subsidies for children younger than three years are conditioned on positive working hours of the mother. As can be seen from columns 5 and 6, the difference between the intensive and the extensive elasticity is in particular strong for the group of lone mothers with children younger seven years and the difference is increasing over the earnings points. This explains the pattern of the welfare function that makes the current tax system optimal for this group. For the women working at the highest earnings points, the relative welfare weights are very low and amount to about 10% of the marginal weights for the women out of work. In addition to the high marginal tax rates even at the higher earnings points, this result is again related to the relatively high elasticity at the extensive margin, which might justify in-work credits at this point, or at least higher transfers conditional on work. Thus, given the theory of optimal taxation, the only way to rationalize the current tax system are the low welfare weights the government assigns to this group.
The simulated welfare function for lone mothers with older children hardly differs from the optimal weights for single women without children. Relative to the weight assigned to the non-working women, the welfare weights for the working women are relatively low. In contrast to lone mothers with very young children, the welfare weight at the lowest earnings point is the lowest. At higher earnings points welfare weights are slightly increasing. This is related to the high marginal tax rates at low earnings. Most of the transfers are withdrawn at rates close to 100% and therefore marginal tax rates are highest when starting to work.
Comparing the marginal welfare function conditional on the presence and age of children we find two main results. Conditional on the labor supply responses, society values the welfare of non-working lone mothers with preschool-age children relatively high and has a particular low value for women at higher earnings points. Women at higher earnings points tend to be full-time working women. 16 If children are older, society still has a high value for the non-working women but has stronger valuation for women at the higher earnings points. Moreover, when comparing these results with a simulation where in-kind childcare benefits are not explicitly modeled as part of the tax and transfer system, we find an important difference. Without consideration of in-kind benefits, we find that weights for working mothers with children under seven years are negative (see Appendix A). This rather strange result vanishes if we explicitly include in-kind childcare benefits.
Optimality of the tax and benefit system: reforming childcare subsidies
In the following, we derive the marginal welfare weights that would justify a reform of the childcare subsidies as discussed in Section 2. This analysis is partly static, i.e. without behavioral changes. We assume that the distribution of women at the defined gross earnings points is not affected; yet we simulate the elasticities given the new incentives of the childcare reform. For this analysis we focus only on the overall population and the subgroups the reforms are targeted at, namely lone mothers with children younger than school age for the first reform, and for the second reform, mothers with children in primary school age. Table 4 yields the results of the tax and transfer system after the TAG reform that is currently implemented. The changes for the overall population are relatively moderate as only the group with children younger than seven years is affected. For this group, however, we find marked changes. First, the 16. Note, in our framework the discrete points at which the government optimally sets the net taxes have been defined along the earnings distribution and not at working hours. reform increases work incentives. On average, net household income increases at all working points and the changes are increasing with gross earnings. The relative increase at the highest earnings point amounts to about 4%. The stronger incentives are reflected in the slightly increased labor supply elasticities, both on the extensive and the intensive margin. However, even after the reform the above-discussed equity-efficiency argument remains as the higher extensive elasticity provide arguments for in-work credits. In comparison with the status quo scenario, the relative marginal weights for working lone mothers increase. The relative marginal weight at the first earnings point increases from 0.39 to 0.49. Changes become even more relevant at higher earnings points where lone mothers make use of fulltime childcare. This is in particular true for the last point, where the weights increase from 0.17 to 0.37. Thus, our findings indicate that the current reform of in-kind benefits is only optimal when the society increases marginal welfare weights for the working lone mothers relative to those for mothers who do not work. Moreover, work at high earnings points, which is mainly full-time work, receives the highest relative increase in the marginal welfare function. Given the higher labor market participation rate of women and in particular mothers in several neighboring countries, for example France, and the current normative discussion about the compatibility of children and work, this shift in the marginal welfare function seems plausible. Table 5 shows the results for the second reform. In this scenario childcare facilities are extended for part-time care of school-aged children. Again, the overall effects are moderate, as the major share of single mothers is not affected by this reform. The more generous in-kind transfers for this subgroup increase the work incentives as the net household income increases with gross earnings. This is only true for full-time work, as part-time childcare is not affected by the reform. As discussed above, we do not account for either costs or subsidies for schooling. Therefore, we find most of the changes for this group at the higher earnings points, where women tend to work full time. For the households with children at primary school we find the expected pattern: since part-time working women do not benefit from the second reform the relative marginal weight at the first earnings point remains relatively low with 32%. At the higher points, however, the relative marginal weights are increasing due to the reform when comparing the weights with the status quo regime. The relative marginal weight for this group at higher working points increases from 40% to nearly 50%. Thus, again these results imply that a reform of the in-kind transfers for the group of lone mothers with primary school-aged children is only optimal if the society shifts higher relative welfare values to the working mothers.
CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on optimal taxation. We combine a theoretical model of optimal taxation with microsimulation and a behavioral econometric model to analyze the optimal design of the tax and transfer system of single women in Germany. Two empirical observations motivate our analysis. First, the different design of transfer programs conditional on the presence and age of children and, second, current political reforms that aim at increasing the in-kind benefits for childcare conditional on employment.
Our empirical results suggest that conditional on the labor supply responses of women, German society has a relatively strong taste of redistribution toward non-working single women. The marginal welfare weights for non-working women are clearly higher than for the working, and this result holds regardless of the presence and age of children. The interesting difference conditional on children is that society seems to value part-time work (i.e. lower earnings points) of lone mothers with children younger than school age relatively higher than full-time work (i.e. higher earnings points), whereas for women with older or without children, the opposite is true. For these groups the higher earnings points are valued stronger. We further find that a reform of in-kind childcare subsidies conditioned on employment markedly changes the marginal welfare function of the society for the targeted groups. The 'TAG' reform, which is currently implemented in Germany with the aim to provide subsidized childcare slots for all children under three years with working parents, is only optimal from a welfare perspective if society increases marginal welfare weights for full-time work, or more precisely work at the higher earnings point. The second hypothetical reform, suggesting to extend childcare facilities for part-time care of school-aged children, leads to a similar result. This reform is only optimal if society increases the relative marginal welfare weights for the working lone mothers and thus slightly shifting from the valuation of equity to efficiency.
However, even under the two reforms that allocate more subsidies toward working single mothers, the tax-transfer system is only optimal if the marginal weights for non-working mothers are higher than for working mothers. Thus, we find that the system with higher workconditioned in-kind transfers is only optimal if the society still has a strong taste for equity, or a relative high marginal welfare weight for the nonworking single mothers.
APPENDIX A: ESTIMATION RESULTS
Instead of interpreting the coefficients estimated in the discrete-choice model, we analyze the labor supply behavior by calculating labor supply reactions given a change in gross wages. The labor supply reactions are derived numerically based on the estimated preferences of the labor supply model. The gross-wage elasticities presented here can be interpreted as a general measure to understand how individuals react to changes in work incentives. Note that these effects differ from those defined by Saez, which will be derived in the following section, as the changes in work incentives differ.
Tables A.1 and A.2 summarize labor supply elasticities with respect to changes in labor market participation and with respect to working hours. In general, the labor supply responses of single women are very moderate. Only lone mothers with preschool-age children strongly react to changes in work incentives. The average elasticities with respect to participation is about two times larger than the overall population mean and the elasticity with respect to working hours even three times. 
